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From as early as the 15th century when European explorers rounded the tip of Africa in search 
of trade routes to the East. until the early twentieth century. the West. through the territorial 
expansion of empire, established itself as the dominant authority within the global political 
order. Ideologically inspired conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century, Cold War 
tensions and the process of decolonization. however. resulted in a fundamental change in the 
nature of this power and global influence, and led to the construction of a new global order 
that had never existed before. After centuries of being structured around the power of a few 
European countries with colonial subjects. the post-colonial order was based on formal 
equality between states, where the notion of territorial expansion and paternal rule were no 
longer accepted practices. Instead, power within the international system was determined by 
economic competition and the notion of 'civilization' was replaced by the ideal of economic 
development. predominantly through the forces of the international capitalist system. 
The aIm of the following chapters is to highlight the dominant discourse of the Anglo-
American liberal tradition within the context of the changing global order, and argue, more 
specifically, that the process of decolonization can be used as a lens through which changes 
ret1ecting how the 'liberal task' was conceived within Anglo-American political thought, can 
be traced. Furthermore, it aims to show that Anglo-American political philosophy in the post-
colonial era can understood as a part of a larger historical process. dating back to the work 
John Stuart Mill in the early nineteenth century. By contrasting the liberalisms of Mill, the 
British Idealists and Isaiah Berlin, and their responses to the question of colonial rule, this 
history sheds light on the fundamental impulses of the liberal tradition between the colonial 
and post-colonial periods. It is widely known that Mill was employed by the East India 
Company and that the subject of colonial rule, to some extent. informed his liberalism. There 
has also been much written on how Mill uses his 'simple' principle ofliberty to justify British 
intervention into the affairs of 'backward' societies. In a similar way the work of the Idealists 
was concerned with liberalism in the age of Empire and they commented directly on how the 
liberal 'project' could best explain the practice of colonialism. Berlin' s liberalism, however, 
does not fit this pattern. Although he does, at times make. passing remarks regarding 
colonialism and the nature of anti-colonial struggles, his liberalism is not informed by 










Berlin's philosophy to this project is m exammmg how the process of decolonization 
impacted upon the purpose of Anglo-American thought. In other words, Berlin's liberalism 
elucidates the contrasts that can be drawn between Anglo-American thought in colonial and 
post-colonial eras. and is foundational to the liberalisms of those. such as Rawls, who 
arguably re-defined political thought in the post-colonial West. The following chapters, 
therefore. do not intend to argue that the Anglo-American liberal tradition was directly 
focussed on the problem of colonialism or that the links between the three chapters are 
complete, but rather that when read within the context of colonial rule and by analyzing what 
the liberal tradition does have to say on the subject one can establish that the problems facing 
Anglo-American thought in the post colonial-era are part of a deeper historical tradition. 
Initiated by the independence of India in 1947, the process of decolonization, which spread 
throughout Asia and Africa over the following thirty years, changed the manner in which 
politics and power were interpreted within the international system. The change in global 
structure and role of the West within the international system was inevitably reflected in 
Anglo-American political philosophy. Primarily, decolonization signalled the end of the 
West's' civilizing mission' which, for centuries, was used as a moral justification for colonial 
rule. John Stuart Mill in his famous essay On Liberty (1859) held that "Despotism is a 
legitimate mode of dealing with barbarians. provided the end be their improvement.'" He 
continued with this argument in Considerations on Representative Government (1861) when 
he stated that "the great majority of the human race" remained in such a "savage or semi-
savage state:' requiring that they be ruled by "the more advanced.,·2 During the period of 
colonial rule Anglo-American political thought sought to offer an account of 'political and 
social relationships at the widest possible level of generality.' providing a universal standard 
by which societies could be judged. At the same time. these principles were used, often 
ambiguously. to justify the practice of colonial rule and thus the West used its moral 
resources, conceived within the liberal tradition, to support its Imperial global domination. 
I J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in Collected Works of John Stllartllvlill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 
vol. 18, p. 224. 
2 J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. in Collected Works of John Stuart lv/ill (Toronto: 











Both 1. S. Mill and the British Idealists who succeeded him, believed in the superiority of 
Western culture and the need to spread, paternalistically if necessary, liberal principles 
throughout the colonised world. Although the principles which formed the basis of their 
philosophies were fundamentally ditTerent, they shared the commonly held belief in the West 
that that their societies were culturally superior to the 'backward' ways of life practiced 
within the colonies, thus justifying paternal intervention. Mill endorsed a utilitarianism which 
held individual freedom as the highest good and believed that it was only in societies which 
fostered such a principle that civilization could progress. For Mill. the role of the state was to 
produce self-developed. autonomous agents who would be able to lead satisfying, progressive 
lives within a civilised society, and justified colonial intervention on the grounds of preparing 
under-developed states for self-government through a • civilizing' process. Unlike Mill who 
saw colonial rule as a moral imperative, the Idealists based their colonialism on the notion 
that it was inherited responsibility that had to be fulfilled. The Idealists otTered a more 
collectivist approach based on a conception of the General Will within society, and believed 
that because the state is the ultimate expression and sustainer of moral communities, the 
imperial task required them to provide a philosophy which made coherent a General Will 
within colonised states. What is signiticant with regard to the liberalisms of both Mill and the 
Idealists is that although fundamentally different. they both saw the West as a paternal figure 
within the international order and justified colonialism on the grounds of civilization, defined 
by Western society. 
This mode of thought remained dominant until after World War II and was replaced in the 
post-colonial order by the notion of economic development, dictated by the forces of the 
international market system. Paternal intervention into the affairs of other states was thus no 
longer the accepted method of drawing African and Asian states into the global capitalist 
system. The economic and social welfare of the former colonial subjects was left to the 
responsibility of new governing elites, who were generally the primary figures behind the 
liberation movements struggling against colonial powers for political autonomy. Whilst a 
system of political and national equality was established within the post-colonial order. 
growing material inequality meant that the restructured system was still subjected to Western 
economic domination. Cold War tensions also had a signiticant influence on the nature of 
post-colonial system, in that in the struggle between the West and the Soviet bloc for the 











independent states was largely forgotten, and their' global vision' became principally dictated 
by the forces of the Cold War struggle. 
The post-colonial period also signalled a distinct shift in the trajectory of Anglo-American 
thought and the application of liberal principles in the West. In 1956 Peter Laslett claimed in 
his introduction to Politics. Philosophy. and Society that political philosophy concerned with 
"political and social relationships at the widest level of generality" was dead. 3 He made the 
argument that the Anglo-American tradition which sought to prescribe universal political 
principles had. "for the time being anyway:' stopped.-l The rise of analytical philosophy 
confined philosophical thought to dealing with linguistic muddles, steering it away from 
making universal claims on human nature. The impulse of Anglo-American thought was to 
restrict the sphere of argument and maintain only a narrow sphere where its conclusions were 
applicable. The analytical tradition distinguished political and philosophical principles on the 
basis of the conceptual clarity, where unity is preferred to diversity because diversity was 
seen as a result of conceptual confusion. The Anglo-American tradition thus returned to 
defending principles of individualism over collective goals in that collective goals were seen 
to be unclear and of diverse meaning. Isaiah Berlin, arguably the iconic figure of the Anglo-
American tradition in the post-war period, claimed in his defence for negative liberty that 
because of the lack of theoretical clarity any collective or 'positive' conception of freedom 
can be made to serve the needs of "every dictator, inquisitor and bully who seeks moraL or 
even aesthetic. justification for his conduct:,5 
The practical consequence of this 'shift' was that in endorsing regImes which supported 
individual rights and which characterised the spirit of the capitalist West Anglo-American 
philosophy rejected any collective threat to their global dominance on the basis of theoretical 
incoherence. In other words, although it did not defend, or even need to defend colonialism, 
the liberal tradition treated any collective challenge to colonial rule as theoretically 
3 See Peter Laslett (ed.) '"Introduction" in Philosophy. Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. I 
~ Ibid. p. 1 
5 Isaiah Berlin. "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Henry Hardy (ed.) Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 











incoherent. In his essay titled "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" which was published in 
Peter Lasletf s second edition of Philosophy. Politics and Society. Berlin states that 
'·where ... concepts are firm, clear and generally accepted, and the methods of reasoning ... are 
agreed between men ... there and only there is it possible to construct a science." He goes on to 
say that "where concepts are vague or too much in dispute, and methods of argument ... are 
not generally agreed ... we are at best in the realm of quasi-science:' It is into the latter 
category that Berlin claims "misty ideologies" fall. 6 Collective responses to Western 
hegemony, according to Berlin. are examples of such ideologies and have "not succeeded in 
passing the required tests" to be considered as being based on sound philosophical 
arguments. 7 The trajectory of Anglo-American thought in the post-colonial era was thus 
strictly restricted to the bastions of Western capitalism, leaving the real workings of the 
Western capitalist system and the struggles facing post-colonial societies outside the 
boundaries of coherent philosophical argument. 
* 
It has been argued by many modem political philosophers that a survey of contemporary 
Anglo-American political philosophy should necessarily begin with John Rawls's A Theory 
of Justice, published in 1971, in that it set the precedent upon which political philosophy has 
been shaped in the post-colonial West.8 It is the argument of the following chapters, that the 
issues facing the post-colonial order and the response of Anglo-American thought to these 
can be understood as part of a much longer social history. As Ellen Wood claims, in order to 
understand how political thought has developed through time and what the history political 
theory can teach us about our contemporary circumstance, it is important to "place ourselves 
on the continuum of history, where we are joined to our predecessors not only by our 
continuities we share but by the processes of change that intervene between US.,,9 By 
analysing the changing attitudes of the liberal tradition to the subject of colonial rule, the 
problems facing Anglo-American thought in the post-colonial era, and which still pose 
6 Isaiah Berlin. "Does Political Theory Still Exist," in Peter Laslett (ed.), Philosoph},'. Politics and Society 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 2-3 
. Ibid. p. 3 
8 See Will Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2002), p. 9 
9 Ellen Meiksins Wood. Citi::ens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought From Antiquity to the 











signiticant questions for political thinkers today, can be understood. Although it must be 
noted that there are a number of ways of tracing the relationship between the Anglo-
American liberal tradition and the problem of colonial rule. both time and space limits this 












MILL'S LIBERAL PROJECT AND DEFENCE OF COLONIALISM 
·· ... despotism is a legitimate mode of dealing with barbarians. provided the end be their improvement..." 10 
I. The Liberal Landscape in Nineteenth Century Britain 
Nineteenth century Britain may be regarded as the . golden era' of liberal philosophy and 
practice. in that it exemplified, in practical politics. the historical paradigm of the classical 
tradition of minimal state activity and an individualist character of life. John Gray, in his 
book Liberalism, captures the essence of the 'liberal civilization' that nineteenth century 
Britain aspired to by quoting A. 1. P. Taylor: 
Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the 
existence of the state ... He could live where he liked and how he liked ... He had no official number or 
identity card. He could ... leave his country forever without a passport ... exchange his money ... without 
restriction. Unlike other countries on the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to 
perform military service. It [the State] left the adult citizen alone. I I 
When tracing the development of the liberal tradition, however, it is crucial to understand 
that the nineteenth century saw a fundamental shift from, what is considered, the classical 
liberal tradition towards a more revisionist approach- an approach which. to a large degree, 
compromised the primary insights of the classical school. I2 Although victories such as the 
Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, the Reform Act of 1832 and the repeal of the Com Laws 
of 1846 seem to strengthen the position of classical liberal practice in the 1800' s, Gray argues 
that the latter half of the century provides evidence of a 'piecemeal shift' away from the 
10 Mill, On Liberty. p. 224 
II A. 1. P. Taylor. English History 191-1-19-15 (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1965), p.1 











'minimalist state' advocated by the individualist principles of the classical tradition towards 
greater government intervention and activity. 13 With regard to the realm of ideas or 
philosophical theory, however, the retreat of the classical liberal tradition begins much earlier 
and can be traced to the rise of the Philosophical Radicals and the work of Jeremy Bentham 
and James Mill. , Benthamite' utilitarianism, of which James Mill was a close disciple, 
ruptured the development of the classical tradition by employing the Principle of Utility as a 
quantitative measure of different policies on public welfare and created a system of thought 
which legitimised the interventionist theories of the British Idealists in the latter half of the 
century: a rupture which would ultimately be used to defend the socialist engineering policies 
of Stalinist Russia by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in the middle of the twentieth century.I4 
Although not all the practical effects of Utilitarian philosophy were anti-liberal- in that they 
did inspire reforms in public health, civil service and local government in tune with the 
classical tradition- as it was "transmitted into public life via the Philosophical Radicals .. .it 
had an inherent tendency to spawn policies of interventionist social engineering:,15 
It was into this intellectual environment that John Stuart Mill was born, or as Alan Ryan 
suggests, 'grew up with' and which had a marked inf1uence on his philosophy. 16 As shall be 
illustrated as this chapter unfolds, Mill's liberalism, in many respects, returned to the classical 
tradition and his commitment to individualism supercedes his commitment to the Utilitarian 
reforms of the Philosophical Radicals. In some of his other works and in particular in his later 
life, however, Mill's views on nationalism, socialist experimentation and trade unions signaL 
to some extent. a departure from the classical tradition and 'in his single person.,.spans the 
interval between the old and the new liberalism' that was to take up a particular force in the 
latter decades of the century and early twentieth century. 17 This background is necessary in 
that it gives essential perspective on the development of the liberal tradition and, most 
importantly for the purpose of this project, on the changing attitudes towards colonial rule. 
13 [b'd 78 I . p._ 
14 Ibid. 30 
15 Ibid. p. 29 
16Alan Ryan, J. S. Alill (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). p. 8 
I~ L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism in, James Meadowcroft ed., Hobhollse: Liberalism and Other Writings 











II. James Mill and the East India Company: Their Influence on Mill's Colonialism 
John Stuart Mill was probably the outstanding and most widely studied British philosopher of 
the nineteenth century. He was a member of British Parliament as well as a colonial 
administrator. and followed in his father's footsteps in becoming Chief Examiner at the East 
India Company, a privately owned joint-stock company which controlled vast regions of 
Britain's largest colony. His academic interests, both vast and complex, have been of critical 
importance to Western philosophy over the past 150 years. and in particular, his acclaimed 
work On Liberty is often considered the 'manifesto' for modem liberal thought. It is widely 
acknowledged that Mill was a 'public' thinker. actively engaged in the debates of his time 
and place, and that his writing sought to explain and defend what he believed to be the 
fundamental philosophical. moral and political principles by which modem society should be 
organised. 18 What prompted Mill to think and write, therefore, was the 'state of the social. 
literary. intellectual or religious world about him' .19 How he viewed the issue of colonial rule 
and what questions he asked that his philosophy sought to explain in defence of Imperialism, 
therefore, become clear when analyzed within the context of his work as a public figure. By 
examining his work for the East India Company, as well as his engagements with his 
contemporaries on political issues of their time and locating them within the context of his 
philosophy, great insights can be gained into his attitude towards colonial rule and British 
Empire. 
* 
Any account of the work of John Stuart Mill needs to begin with mention of his father and the 
huge impact he had on his son's life. Much has been written about the extraordinary int1uence 
James Mill had over his son, especially with regard to the unusual and intense education he 
taught and which Mill himself recounts in his Autobiography. 20 Born in 1773 to a successful 
shoemaker in the Scottish village of Northwater Bridge, James Mill went on to study Divinity 
at Edinburgh University and became a licensed Presbyterian minister. thanks largely to the 
financial support and social patronage of local baronet John Stuart. Unable to find work as a 
18 See John Rawls. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. ::W07). p. 252 
19 Ryan. 1. S. Afill. pp. 4-5 
cO 1. S. Mill. Autobiography. in Collected Works of John Stuart Ami (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 











preacher, or, it has been argued, through losing faith in the Church itsel±: Mill moved to 
London in 1802 to pursue a writing career and, along with his friend Jeremy Bentham, was 
among the leaders of the utilitarian radical movement in early nineteenth century Britain.21 
Aside from editing and writing for a number ofjoumals and newspapers of little significance, 
James Mill was a devout defender of extending education to all social classes and a vehement 
supporter of freedom of the press. As Ryan notes, James Mill moved to London during a time 
when all the 'ingredients' for a new radicalism were being created by an upsurge in 
intellectual activity in Britain, following the war in America and influenced by the early 
stages of the French Revolution. Political and social power had begun to shift, creating a 
middle-class that was resentful of political exclusion and whose voice was becoming ever 
louder. It was out of this that the philosophical radicalism, lead largely by Bentham and the 
elder MilL emerged. 22 Over the duration of eleven years after moving to London, Mill wrote 
his acclaimed History of British India, a book in which he spoke of the nature of Indian 
society and their domination by the British, and it was after the publication of this book that 
he gained employment in the Examiner's office at the East India Company, a position that his 
son was to later follow. Although the younger Mill often expressed reservations about the 
utilitarian philosophy of his father and Bentham, James Mill had a particular influence over 
his son with regard to his views towards British Imperialism and his devout belief in the 
importance of education as essential to individual and social development.23 
Mill"s tenure in the Examiners Ot1ice at the East India Company, which began in 1823 and 
ended when the company was dissolved following the Sepoy Rebellion in 1858, provides a 
useful context from which to study his views on the 'mission' of the East India company and 
the state of Indian society and, furthermore elucidates the consistency between his liberal 
principles and his support for colonial rule. In entering the Examiner's ot1ice at a young age 
as his father's unpaid assistant, J. S. Mill's early years in India House were probably a 
continuation of his father's special education that aimed to prepare him to inherit the tradition 
of 'Benthamite' utilitarianism to which his father subscribed, a tradition that John Stuart Mill 
21 Ryan, J. S. Mill, pp. 6-8 
22 Ibid. p. 7 
. C I'd d' particular Remarks on Bentham's 
23 For his criticisms of Bentham .see ]. S. MIll, ~entham: .ouer.l ge.~ ;~oronto Pr~ss 1977). vol. 10 











was to later reject.2..! Like his father though, Mill was of the opinion that British control over 
Indian society was in the long-term interests of the Indian people. He too saw little value in 
Indian culture and agreed with the view that it was 'despotic', 'stagnant' 'backward' and 
'barbaric'.25 In the words of James Mill, "As the manners, institutions, and attainments of the 
Hindus, have been stationary for many ages; in beholding the Hindus of the present day, we 
are beholding the Hindus of many ages past: and are carried back, as it were, into the deepest 
recesses of antiquity.',26 
Colonial rule was thus not a moral concern for either of the Mill's in that both believed it was 
good and just because it advanced civilization and promoted the general welfare of the 
colonized population. John Stuart Mill constantly defended the role of the East India 
Company before Britain's Parliament and went to great lengths to describe the multitude of 
ways in which Indian society had benetitted from British rule, especially with regard to 
public services and the establishment of political and social institutions. In 1853, for example, 
he stated: "It must be said that the years which have since elapsed have been marked by a 
degree of activity in every description of public improvement, not only greater than that 
exhibited previously, but unsurpassed, it is believed, in any country in any age."27 
This highlights Mill's belief that the mission of the East India Company was to help provide 
Indian society with the stimulus necessary for development and progress, without which they 
would remain a backward and stagnant race. Mill's views on colonialism reflected the age in 
which he lived, when few Europeans questioned the notion that their cultures were far 
superior to other contemporary cultures, that Western European society was at the forefront 
of development and civilization, and thus that it was their moral duty to spread their 'ways' to 
all peoples of the world.28 Mill's admiration for European culture andjustitication for British 
2-1 Lynn Zastoupil, "J. S. Mill and India." in Victorian Studies, Vol. 32, No.1 (Autumn, 1988), p. 34 
25 See Robert Kurfirst. "J. S. Mill on Oriental Despotism" in Utilitas. Vol. 8. No.1, p. 75 
26 James Mill. The History of British India (Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1975). p. 248 
2" J. S. Mil\. Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India During the last thirty Years, in 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, (977), vol. 30, p. 93 
28 Don Habibi. "The Moral Dimensions of J. S. Mil\'s Colonialism." in Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 30, 











paternalism, is highlighted by his claim that "among the inhabitants of our earth, the 
European family of nations is the only one which has ever yet to show any capability of 
spontaneous improvement beyond a certain low-lever,.29 Mill's claim that .' ... despotism is a 
legitimate mode of dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement. .. " otTers 
further support for his colonialism and his acknowledgement of the superiority of European 
cultures as the most progressive forces to stimulate growth and development within stagnant, 
non-progressive societies. 30 Backward societies, according to Mill, had no right to non-
interference as he did not believe that progression was a 'naturaL historical process', but 
rather that 'backward' societies would remain in such a state unless there was paternalistic 
intervention by a more developed nation. Founded on his utilitarian justification, Mill 
claimed that in comparison to the chaos and despotism it replaced, British rule provided 
order. unification and a liberal challenge to the traditional repression which fuelled the 
stagnation of most 'backward' societies. This 'vision' is evident in the fact that Mill 
vehemently opposed a system of indirect rule where the "British propped up Indian princes as 
semi-autonomous allies and used them as bulwarks against possible threats from other 
princes or rebellious subjects", and believed that such a system was detrimental to the 
'Imperial task'. 31 Indirect rule merely protected the atrocious behaviour of: what was 
considered by MilL a 'barbaric' and 'backward' social system. Direct British rule, on the 
other hand, was the only appropriate method to fulfil the 'civilising mission' of colonial rule 
and therefore advocated the importance of good administration to bringing about social and 
1·· l' 32 po Itica Improvement. 
It is important to note that Mill condoned colonialism only insofar as it's 'end be the 
improvement' of the colonized, and that it was limited by the point in time where the 
subjected peoples become capable of ruling themselves. 33 In MiIrs 'Minute on the Black 
29 1. S. Mill, De Tocqlleville on Democracy in America. in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 18, p. 197 
10 Mill. On Liberty, p. 224 
31 Zastoupil, "Mill and India," p. 37 
12 Ibid. p. 38 











Act', he explicitly expresses the limits and boundaries of British Empire and the fact that 
British rule should never be to the detriment of the interests or rights of the natives. He 
plainly states that: "Natives of India need protection against the English, and that to afford 
them that protection is one of the first duties of the British government in India" He goes on 
to say: ·,It should be proclaimed that the English who resort to India or any foreign 
possession, to make their fortunes, are naturally inclined to despise the natives and seek to 
make themselves a privileged caste. That is a pretension that ought to be resisted; and it is 
because the company has always resisted it, that the English public of Calcutta are as a body, 
always hostile to the company's government." Most importantly, Mill emphasised that: 
" ... our Empire in India ... will not exist for a day after we shall lose the character of being more 
just and disinterested than the native rulers and of being united among ourselves,,34 Colonial 
rule and the 'mission' of the East India Company thus had a significant moral imperative for 
Mill which is inextricably linked to his ardent belief in progress and development, and which 
is easily identified in his 'liberal project' as a whole. 
It is my argument that at the basis of John Stuart Mill's defence of colonialism and key to 
understanding his life's work in general, is his unwavering belief in the importance of human 
growth, development and progress. Although his support for colonial rule often seems at odds 
with his latitudinarian views on issues such as women's rights, the promotion of civil liberties 
and the protection of individual autonomy in the face of social tyranny, under closer 
examination it becomes evident that the fundamental liberal values he advocates throughout 
his political theory are foundational to his colonialism. From his utilitarianism, which forms 
the basis of his liberalism, to his comments on civilization and culture, the notion of 
'progress' is the ligament which holds his philosophy together. This is highlighted in the 
dedication to On Liberty where he borrows from Wilhelm von Humboldt's Spheres and 
Duties of Government, and states that " ... the Grand, leading principle, towards which every 
argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance 
of human development in its richest diversity',.35 The concept of 'progress' in Mill's writing. 
which includes terms such as development, cultivation, elevation of character and refinement, 
,4 All three references come from: 1. S. Mill, Minute on the Black Act, in Collected Works a/John Stuart Mill 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 30, p. 14-15 











thus "constitute[ s] a moral force in Mill's worldview ... helps define and justify his utilitarian 
value system ... his understanding of happiness, liberty and individuality ... " and " ... elucidates 
the moral dimensions of his support for colonialism ... ,,36 
III. Mill's Colonialism in the Context of His Utilitarianism 
Like traditional utilitarians, Mill believed that 'utility' or 'intrinsic value' is the foundation of 
morality and thus his primary principle of utility asserts that "actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness", 
holding that the ultimate principle of human good is the experience of happiness or 
pleasure.37 'Right' or 'just' actions are therefore those which provide the most happiness for 
the greatest number of people. It is important to note that Mill was highly revisionist in his 
utilitarianism and subscribed to a hedonism that distinguished between higher and lower 
forms of pleasures based on quality.38 Earlier utilitarian thinkers, such as Bentham and Mill's 
father, subscribed only to a quantitative hedonism, which Mill criticized for portraying 
human beings as "being capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable".39 
Whilst lower forms merely consist of sensations, pleasures of the intellect- such as sentiments 
of morality, feelings and imagination- appeal to a higher faculty only humans' possess. It is 
to these' higher pleasures' that Mill's utilitarianism speaks. For Mill, utility and appeasement 
of the 'higher pleasures' was therefore the foundation of practical and moral reasoning, and 
forms the evaluative platform upon which morality is based. Drawing on this, Mill places 
much emphasis on the importance of 'self-developed agents' who, he believed, are the most 
likely to maximise utility, promote good in the world and lead satisfying lives. He defines 
self-developed agents as those who are in the position to attain maximal happiness and who 
have reached a level of perspective that is appropriate of evaluating which paths of life are 
36 Habibi, "Moral Dimensions," p. 125 
37 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in Collected Works of John Stuart lvlill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1977), vol. 10, p. 210 
38 For more on the 'Nature of the Good' and Mill's argument for 'Qualitative Hedonism' see Wendy Donner, 
"MiIrs Utilitarianism," in John Skorupski, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 256-273 











worth pursuing.-lO In other words, a 'self-developed agent' is a person who has developed the 
appropriate 'evaluative platform of morality' necessary to distinguish between 'right' and 
'wrong' methods of action. The preference and choices of self-developed agents are pivotal 
to Mill's utilitarianism in that they are in the best position to indicate the values which 
promote the highest levels of happiness, making them 'both the judge and locus of value,.-ll 
Mill is extremely concerned with the notion of 'right action' in order to promote happiness 
and thus also with the provision of a social environment in which self-development is 
possible. 
In line with his utilitarianism and qualitative hedonism, the level and nature of a society's 
development held significant moral implications for Mill. Progressive societies with mature, 
morally developed citizemies are in a position to benefit from a wide-range of civil liberties, 
whereas backward societies, with immature, stagnant citizemies are not, thus requiring 
paternalist intervention to provide the social management necessary to stimulate growth. In 
System of Logic Mill alludes to this in his science of 'ethology', which involved an empirical 
study of human nature and advocated an 'art of education' that encourages the tendencies 
within individual character that render the most utility if manifested by society as a whole.-l2 
His ethology relies heavily on his belief that human character is highly dependent on 
historical and social circumstance, and argues that ignorance of the "irresistible proofs" that 
show that differences in "individuals, races or sexes" would be produced by differences in 
circumstance, is the "chief hindrance" and "greatest stumbling block" to human 
improvement.-l3 He goes on to say that because social environments are crucial to 
development, both individual and collective, and that different "states of society" lead to 
different levels of development, where needed, political and social environments must be 
coaxed into creating conditions optimal for progress and development. Education, for Mill, 
should thus include the 'formation of national or collective character as well as individual' 
and thus concern for the 'social feeling of mankind' becomes critical to the educational 
~o See Donner, "Mill's Utilitarianism," p. 274- 278 
-II Ibid. p. 274 
.11 Mill, A ~vstem of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 8, pp. 869-870 











process required for self-development.44 Mill believed strongly in the power of 'collective 
will' and believed that if administered in a mature fashion, through responsible public 
institutions, it held the ability of creating a social environment conducive to progress. By 
examining the actions of a nation en masse, he claimed that one can make the best 
generalizations about the individuals composing it:~5 By examining Indian society and 
culture, Mill believed that the' despotic' regimes of traditional Indian society did not cultivate 
a social environment which enabled self-development therefore justifying paternal 
intervention. Mill's liberalism, which is essentially a utilitarian defence of liberty, offers 
further support for his colonialism and elucidates the importance he placed on self-
development as essential to maximising utility within society. 
Mill's primary focus in On Liberty was to protect individual liberty from social tyranny, and 
he was extremely aware of the power that collective opinion had over individual freedom. 
Mill realised that he lived during a time when the movement towards democracy was 
irreversible and, although he welcomed it on liberal and moral grounds, he was conscious of 
the danger that collective opinion has over individual expression and sought a liberalism to 
prevent such tyranny. For Mill, therefore, public institutions were to provide individuals with 
protection from illegitimate coercion and to create an environment conducive to individual 
expression and self-development. 
There needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the 
tendency of society to impose, by means other than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of 
conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development and, if possible, prevent the formation 
of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon 
the model of its own.~6 
In other words, public institutions should provide for a community of self-developed 
individuals and for an environment where 'collective character' is a manifestation of 
~4 Mill, System of Logic, p. 869-870 
~s Ibid., p. 867 











maXImum utility and this is only possible where protection from tyrannous 'collective 
opinion' is guaranteed. Mill's liberal project was thus to create an environment where the 
utility of society is maximised in line with the principle of liberty and create a society of self-
developed individuals whose 'collective will' was to limit illegitimate coercion of individual 
liberty. The 'simple principle ofliberty' upon which Mill's liberal project is based asserts that 
·'the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering 
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection".-l7 
* 
How then does one correlate Mill's 'simple principle' with his support for colonialism? Does 
it allow for a justified intervention of another person or country's liberty? The answer lays in 
the fact that coercion to prevent 'self-harm' or to prevent someone doing that which he does 
not desire through ignorance, in Mill's eyes, is not a true violation of their liberty. John Gray, 
commenting on Mill's liberalism, suggests that Mill warrants intervention in that he 
"conceives his principle as allowing the state and society to limit a man's liberty so as to 
protect him from the damaging consequences of his own ignorance or delusion".-l8 Mill 
declares the following example to support justified intervention. "If either a public officer or 
anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be 
unsafe, and there was no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him 
back, without any real infringement of his liberty, for liberty consists in doing what desires, 
and he does not desire to fall into the river.,,49 In much the same way as Mill did not believe 
any person would desire to fall into the river, he also believed that no person would desire the 
consequences of living in societies which were detrimental to self-development. It could be 
argued, though, that a person about to fall into a river would be able to articulate his 
unwillingness to fall, yet native support to be ruled paternally by a colonial government could 
not be articulated in the same way thus making colonial intervention unjust. If, however, the 
person about to fall into the river was' deluded' or ignorant of the dangers of falling into the 
river, then he may not be able to express a desire not to fall into the river and it is in the latter 
light, therefore, that Mill viewed Indian society and justified paternal intervention. 
~7 Ibid. p. 223 
~8 John Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 91 











Mill did not restrict his support of justified intervention to circumstances of ignorance, 
misinformation or delusion, but also to conditions from which one makes choices that are less 
than autonomous. Mill thus commits himself to a 'weak-form' of paternalism which allows 
intervention for a limited period of time, preventing agents from acting until such time that 
they are capable of autonomous decision-making and action. 50 Colonialism was thus 
justifiable according to Mill, in that territories, such as India, which had immature societies 
with despotic governments, were in a 'backward state of civilization' and were 'unsusceptible 
of being well-governed,.5] In his essay Civilization, Mill makes a fundamental distinction 
between 'civilised' and 'savage' societies, claiming that a country is considered more 
civilised if, " ... we think it more improved; more eminent in the best characteristics of Man 
and Society; farther advanced in the road to perfection; happier, nobler, wiser...,,52 In savage 
life, on the other hand (which is how he considered Indian society) " ... there is little or no law, 
or administration of justice; no systematic employment of the collective strength of society, 
to protect individuals against injury from one another; everyone trusts to his own strength or 
cunning, and where that fails, he is generally without resource. ,,53 
The people of India, and other 'backward' societies, were not 'autonomous decision-making 
units' in that the 'despotic' conditions under which they lived, prevented them from 
becoming self-developed agents, and their decision-making ability was thus clouded by 
ignorance, misinformation and delusion. The British considered paternal intervention or, 
what Ryan calls 'compulsory liberation' its moral duty, requiring them to bring 'civilization' 
to these parts of the world. 54 Mill's view on intervention did not imply that the British should 
'tour the world looking for people to emancipate', but rather when faced with a situation 
necessary of action, they should not 'flinch from forcing liberal values on those they could 
50 Gray, AliIl On Liberty, p. 92 
51 Mill, The Spirit of Age, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 
vol. 22, p. 289 
52 Mill, Civili::ation, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 18, 
p.119 
53 Ibid. p. 120 
54 Alan Ryan, "Mill in a Liberal Landscape," in John Skorupski, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Mill 











affect'. 55 Mill justified intervention as a means of development it was a 'civilizing mission'. 
He believed that every moral question had a 'right answer' and because the British were a 
society of 'self-developed' persons, they were in the best position to know what moral values 
to pursue or course of 'right action' to follow to ensure maximal happiness. The colonized 
did not, and thus the British were in a position to enforce the 'right answer' upon the 
colonized peoples. 
IV. Mill's Colonialism in the Context of the Liberal Tradition 
Mill's attitude towards colonialism, when read from the context of his work as a whole, 
clearly stems from a moral imperative. Although when read from a contemporary standpoint 
Mill's support for colonialism sits rather uncomfortably with his image as a progressive 
libertarian who longed for the 'widest variety of human life and character' and who 
demanded toleration of differing opinions, when read from the historical context from which 
he wrote, his liberalism and colonialism appear less contradictory. 56 As Berlin notes, Mill 
was not a prophetic writer and he spoke little of the contours of the future. 57 He did not 
predict for example, the cataclysmic events of the twentieth century and tended rather to 
extrapolate the tendencies of his own time. Given his support for colonialism, there is little 
doubt that he expected the liberal institutions of nineteenth century Britain to spread 
throughout the world. 58 He was acutely aware of the destructive forces at play within his own 
world and sought a philosophy that dealt directly with such problems. Although he was 
considered a radical in his day, from a contemporary perspective he has a reputation for being 
a progressive, informed social and political thinker and his principles, to some degree, have 
enlightened the modem liberalisms of theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. 59 The 
principles for which he fought such as civil liberties, women's rights, tolerance of diversity 
and the value of social equality, are strongly supported in the Western tradition of the late 
55 Ibid. pp. 524-525 
56 Isaiah Berlin, "John Stuart Mill in a Liberal Context," in Henry Hardy (ed.) Liberty: Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 229 
57 Ibid. p. 227 
58 See John Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy (London: Routeledge, 1989), p. 229 
59 See in particular, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1972) and Robert Nozick, 











twentieth century. On the contrary, however, his support and moral justification for colonial 
rule would not be considered as 'progressive' or 'enlightened' in the post-colonial era. 
Although it is anachronistic to apply contemporary political 'norms' or 'standards' to the 
philosophy of a nineteenth century political and social theorist by interpreting his work from 
a modem perspective it is possible to gain the insights necessary to trace the trajectory of the 
Western 'liberal project' through the 'colonial lens' and help to better understand the changes 
that occurred from the time of Mill through to the period of decolonization. 
Mill's liberal justification of British Imperialism forwarded an ethnocentric view on society 
and culture which implied that when dealing with 'backward' or 'barbarian' nations, his 
principles of freedom, justice and equality apply only in a paternalistic way. His 'liberal 
project' thus did not apply to what he deemed as the 'uncivilized' in the same way as it did to 
civilized societies, in that he believed that the benefits of liberty can only be enjoyed once a 
certain level of civilization has been reached. Mill's support for colonialism is consistent with 
the historical tradition of late-eighteenth and nineteenth century utilitarianism which accepted 
that the colonized peoples benefitted from Imperial intervention and who were often 
publically active in supporting the British Empire. 6o Like many of his contemporaries, Mill 
could not see beyond the value of European society and, although he advocated the "absolute 
and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity", this only applied to 
societies which, institutionally at least, fostered his 'simple principle of liberty'. European 
society, for Mill, thrived because it was 'scientifically orientated, culturally diverse and not 
rigidly established in custom' .61 
Although there are grounds for arguing that Mill was culturally bigoted, it is difficult to say 
that he was a racist and that his colonialism was based on racial prejudice. Mill attacked the 
view that " .. .to regard all the marked distinctions of human character as innate, and in the 
main inedible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part of those 
differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not only might but 
naturally would be produced by differences in circumstances ... " He claimed that such a view 
60 See Eric Stokes. The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959) 











·' .. .is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of social questions and one of the 
greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement.,,62 
His condemnation of attributing difIerences in development to inherent racial differences is 
also highlighted in the well documented debate with his long-term and cherished friend 
Thomas Carlyle regarding "The Nigger Question". Published anonymously in 1849 III 
Fraser's ll,{agazine, Carlyle took aim at the abolitionist campaign to end the practice of 
slavery in Britain's colonies, led predominantly by English Parliamentary spokesman, 
William Wilberforce. 63 Carlyle was of the view that blacks and the colonial natives in 
generaL were inherently intellectually inferior to Europeans and were morally depraved to the 
level of mere beasts. This belief was also founded on the indictment that the 'negro' was 
inherently lazy.64 Carlyle addressed the Negroes as 
... servants to those that are born lords of you - servants to the whites, if they are (as what mortal can 
doubt that they are?) born wiser than you. That, you may depend on it, my obscure Black friends, is and 
was always the Law of the World, for you and for all men: To be servants. the more foolish of us to the 
more wise; and only sorrow, futility, and disappointment will betide both, till both in some approximate 
degree get to conform to the same. 65 
Mill, in his response to Carlyle's essay entitled The Negro Question, stated on the contrary 
that every difference among humans is not a result of inherent natural differences, but rather 
.. to an infinitely greater variety of accidents and external influences.,,66 He also stated that: 
62 Mill, Autobiography, p. 270 
63 See William Baker, "William Wilberforce on the Idea of Negro Inferiority," in Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 31, NO.3 (July-September, 1970), pp. 433-440 
64 See Thomas Carlyle, "Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question" in Fraser's Maga::ine for Town and 
Country XL, (December, 1849), pp. 670-679 
65 Ibid. p. 677 











Of all the vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on 
the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent 
natural differences. What race would not be indolent and insouciant when things are so arranged, that 
they derive no advantage from forethought or exertion,?67 
It becomes apparent, therefore, that Mill's colonialism was based on a moral imperative to 
'civilise' the backward nations upon which the British Empire stumbled. Although not excuse 
his ethnocentrism, when read in such a light, the congruencies between his liberal and 
utilitarian principles, and his moral justification for colonial rule are elucidated. Unlike many 
of his contemporaries, such as Carlyle, Mill sawall peoples of the earth as inherently similar 
but that due to a 'variety of accidents and external influences', during his lifetime European 
culture was superior to all other cultures. He explicitly renounces that whites were "born ever 
so superior in intelligence to the blacks, and competent by nature to instruct and advise 
them", but rather because "spontaneous improvement, beyond a very low grade-
improvement by internal development, without the aid from other individuals or peoples- is 
one of the rarest phenomena in history", paternal intervention to stimulate growth was 
morally justifiable. 68 
* 
The relationship between Mill's liberalism and colonialism aimed to provide a moral 
justification for colonial rule based on a set of utilitarian principles. In other words, Mill 
sought to morally defend colonialism upon the basis of his world-view, which, although at 
times appears to abandon the individualist tradition and comes uncomfortably close to 
supporting interventionist liberalism that was to succeed him, it maintains, at its core, the 
threads of classical liberalism. This is contrary to British Idealists who were to attack the 
utilitarian philosophy of Mill later in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and whose 
liberalism merely forwarded an explanation on how best to achieve the 'Imperial task'. It has 
to be noted, however, that although Mill placed individual liberty as the highest of all values 
and strongly supported diversity of character, especially when choosing one's own goals, the 
social tensions brewing within British society towards the latter part of his life led him to 
67J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 2, p. 319 











acknowledge the need for 'socialist experimentation'. It was these changes or fluctuations in 
his convictions which had the most significant impact on the school of thinkers that were to 













THE BRITISH IDEALISTS, COLONIALISM AND A DEPARTURE FROM THE 
CLASSICAL TRADITION 
We are little influenced by the idea of the universal brotherhood of men, of mankind as forming one society with 
a common good, of which the conception may determine the action of its members ... Yet [the common good} is 
the proper correlative of the admission ofa right to afree life, [a right} belonging to man in virtue simply of 
human nature. 69 
I. From Mill to the British Idealists: A Revision of the Liberal Tradition 
Towards the end of Mill's prolific career as a political thinker and writer, his views towards 
the state and its role within society began to change. Although he always remained steadfast 
in his belief in the superiority of individual liberty , his Chapters on Socialism (1879) reflect a 
growing concern with regard to the social tensions developing within British society, rooted 
in the effects of unregulated capitalism. Mill thus saw the inevitability of the need for 
revision within political philosophy. Without altogether abandoning the liberalism he 
advocated in On Liberty, his attitude towards trade unions, nationalism and socialist 
experimentation highlight a significant rupture in the fabric of liberal political thought in the 
nineteenth century.70 In the introduction to Chapters on Socialism, speaking on the growing 
voice of the working class and the effect this would have on political thought, Mill stated: 
"The political aims will themselves be detennined by definite political doctrines; for politics 
are now scientifically studied from the point of view of the working class, and the opinions 
conceived in the special interest of those classes are organised into systems and creeds which 
lay claim to a place on the platfonn of political philosophy, by the same right as the systems 
elaborated by previous thinkers.,,7! Mill's departure from the classical tradition was thus 
69 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, in P. Harris and J. Morrow eds, Lectures on 
the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
p.155 
70 For an interesting analysis of the change in trajectory of the liberal tradition see John Gray, Liberalism, 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986), esp. Chapter 4, 'The Liberal Era'. 
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crucial to the development of liberalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As A. V. 
Dicey observed: 
... changes or fluctuations in Mill's convictions, bearing as they do in many points upon legislative 
opinion, are at once the sign, and were in England, to a great extent, the cause. of the transition 
from .. .individualism ... to ... collectivism. His teaching specially affected the men who were just entering 
public life towards 1870. It prepared them at any rate to accept, if not to welcome, the collection which 
from that time onwards has gained increasing strength. 72 
By the late 1870's and early 1880's the revisionist liberalism initiated by Mill, was taken up 
by a group of philosophers in Britain who began to supplant Mill's 'imperfect' classical 
model with ideas inspired by the philosophy of Aristotle, Kant and, above all, Hegel. The 
British Idealists. under the influence of Edward Caird at Glasgow University and, more 
particularly Thomas Hill Green at Oxford, sought a philosophy to 'arrest the development of 
scientific materialism' promoted by the empirical tradition, by fundamentally changing the 
conception of the role of the state within the liberal tradition. 73 By providing a justification 
for state intervention within the spheres of economic life and welfare, and by arguing that the 
role of the state was not only to secure material welfare, but to also provide a sense of 
community in which the 'good life' of all citizens could be articulated, the Idealists provided 
a thorough re-interpretation of the fundamental concepts of political thought. By re-
interpreting concepts such as the individual, community, rights, citizenship, liberties and, in 
tum, human nature, the Idealists aimed to provide a philosophy of greater complexity than 
that of the classical liberals and thus changed the way in which politics was conceived within 
the liberal tradition. 74 
The impact of this change in the trajectory of liberal thought in Britain was not only confined 
to the lecture halls and journals of British academia, but also had a wider impact on practical 
71 A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth 
Century, 1905, p. 432, as quoted in Gray, Liberalism, p. 30 
73 See John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972), pp. 35-72 
74 See Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant, Philosophy. Politics and Citi::enship: The Life and Thought of the 











politics by providing the foundation to institutional change and social reform. As Kenneth 
Dyson argues in his book The State Tradition in Western Europe: "During the period from 
about 1880 to about 1910 philosophical Idealism enjoyed considerable success within 
technical philosophy ... and had an influence on political leaders like Herbert Asquith, R. B. 
Haldane and Alfred Milner, social reformers like William Beveridge and Arnold Toynbee, 
and public servants many of whom were educated in Oxford liberalism ... ,,75 Central to the 
thesis of Idealist thought was the relationship between intellectual and practical politics, and 
thus by examining the fundamental philosophical principles of the Idealist tradition and how 
they formed the basis of a 'practical creed,' an analysis of the change in the liberal attitude 
towards the subject colonial rule becomes possible. It is first important, however, to make a 
brief decent into the philosophy of T. H. Green, who was the most influential of the early 
Idealists in bringing Idealism to popular audience, and then to look at the work of Bernard 
Bosanquet and J. H. Muirhead, both of whom were students of Green, and examine their 
views on the relationship between liberalism and colonialism. 
II. Thomas Hill Green and His Metaphysical Theory of Politics 
It is widely acknowledged that Thomas Hill Green was the most influential of the British 
Idealists and his philosophy set the foundation upon which the Idealist tradition was built. R. 
G. Collingwood, in his Autobiography, stated that: "The school of Green sent out into public 
life a stream of ex-pupils who carried with them the conviction that philosophy, and in 
particular the philosophy they had learned at Oxford, was an important thing and that their 
vocation was to put it into practice ... Through this effect on the mind of its pupils, the 
philosophy of Green's school might be found, from about 1880 to about 1910, penetrating 
and fertilizing every part of the national life.,,76 Whilst predominantly a teacher, Green was 
also an active social reformer and, both as a student and in later life, was a member of a 
number of radical political societies. Although he never a left behind a fully-worked out 
statement of both his political and metaphysical views, due largely to his untimely death from 
blood poisoning at the age of 45, by looking at his work as a whole (of which much was 
published posthumously) it is possible to gain a systematic understanding of his philosophy. 
75 Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Robertson, 1980), p. 191 











The importance of Green's writing, in the context of analysing the trajectory of the liberal 
tradition in relation to colonialism, is rooted in the Monism to which he subscribes and which 
is central to all Idealist thought. Writing against the empiricism re-stated by Mill, Green set 
out to extinguish the belief that reality is something given to us by experience, that facts are 
objective. He argued against the idea that 'reality' is independent of consciousness and 
claimed that "[t]he terms 'real' and 'objective,' then, have no meaning except for a 
consciousness which presents its experiences to itself as determined by relations, and at the 
same time conceives a single and unalterable order of relations determining them ... "n In 
other words, reality lies in relations, remove relations and the objects of experience become 
unintelligible. Reality, according to Green, is thus created by the mind and sustained by 
thought. How then, one may argue, is the world as we experience it objective? How do we 
distinguish between what is real and what is imaginary? Green answers these questions by 
moving from the individual mind to the eternal consciousness. 
Green defines the eternal consciousness as "freedom in the conscious union with God, or 
harmony with the true law of one's being ... freedom in devotion to self-imposed duties.,,78 In 
knowing, individuals slowly become aware of what has always existed as an object of the 
eternal consciousness and thus 'reality' seems objective because it is an object of the eternal 
consciousness and not the individual mind. 79 As individuals become conscious of what the 
eternal consciousness has always known, they too become a part of the eternal consciousness, 
or at least a vehicle for it. In his Prolegomena to Ethics Green writes, " .. .in the growth of our 
experience, in the process of our learning to know the world, an animal organism which has 
its history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness.,,8o 
Green continues by stating that the eternal consciousness is the manifestation of God within 
society, the growing unity of man's will and God's will, and that the ultimate ideal or reality 
of God is always present. It is because of the limits of the human mind, Green argues, which 
77 Thomas Hill Green and A. C. Bradley ed., Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 17 
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prevents individuals from ever fully realizing the eternal conSCIOusness and therefore the 
world appears to be objective. Society, according to Green, is "always keeping before man in 
various guises, according to the degree of his development, an (unrealised) ideal of a best 
which is his God, and giving divine authority to the customs and laws by which some 
likeness of this ideal is wrought into the actuality of life:,81 The importance of Green's 
argument regarding the eternal consciousness lies in how it develops through the minds of 
individuals into the political institutions of society. 
According to Green, morality is found in the reproduction of the eternal consciousness by the 
individual mind. In choosing to pursue certain ends in order to realize the eternal 
consciousness and in transforming natural instincts or impulses to serve rationally conceived 
purposes, Green argues that one acts in accordance with one's 'rear self or his self-conscious 
spiritual self. An end, posed for our self by our rational faculties, according to Green, is 
always good. "The motive in every imputable act for which the agent is conscious on 
reflection that he is answerable is a desire for personal good in some form or other.,,82 Moral 
activity is thus the pursuit of a self-set ideal to which we aspire, which, as mentioned, is the 
manifestation of the spiritual principle seeking to reconcile the 'natural' and the 'ideal,' the 
current self and the possible self. 83 "By a moral ideal we mean some type of man or character 
or personal activity, considered as an end in itself.,,84 Morality, in this sense however, is a 
matter of constant endeavour and individuals never have the knowledge of its actual 
realization. 85 Freedom, for Green, thus can only exist in the 'positive' sense in that it refers to 
the actualization of goals by transforming instincts into rationally thought out objectives and 
is thus closely related to self-realization or the realization of one's 'real' self. With reference 
to freedom Green stated: "We shall probably all agree that freedom, rightly understood, is the 
greatest of blessings; that its attainment is the true end of all our efforts as citizens." He went 
81 Thomas Hill Green, "Faith," in R. L. Nettleship ed., Works of T H. Green Volume: III (London: Longmans 
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on to say that, "when we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a 
positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that 
too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others ... That end is what I call freedom 
in the positive sense: in other words, the liberation of powers of all men equally for 
contributions to the common good:,86 Freedom in the 'positive' sense, freedom as the ability 
to realize one's ideal self and at the same time becoming a vehicle of the eternal 
consciousness, is crucial to Green's political philosophy and the philosophy of those Idealists 
who followed him. 
The moral ideaL according to Green, is the object of free endeavour and although this is 
difficult to expand upon, given that self-realization is never attained, he does offer the form 
that self-realization takes. The substance of this, however, is dependent on the historical 
context in which persons find themselves. Crucial to Green's thought is the metaphysical 
view he held that all people within a society, regardless of social circumstance, share a 
'common good' and thus, that community life links people into a single harmonious whole. 
The 'common good', Green continued, shared by all members of society manifests itself 
through social and political reforms. His view rests on the assumption made by Hegel, that 
mutual recognition is crucial to one's consciousness of self. Man, by nature, according to 
Green, is a social being and requires a society in which human beings are recognized as ends 
in themselves. Self-realization is thus a social activity: " .. .individual men and ... the society 
which is at once established by them and makes them what they are:,87 The ideals which one 
pursues, however, are derived from the context of society at a given time, and he therefore 
argues that self-realization is restricted by one's place and function within society. 88 He 
states: "Human society presupposes persons in capacity- subjects capable each of conceiving 
himself and the bettering of his life as an end to himself- but it is only in the intercourse of 
men each recognized by each as an end not merely a means and each as having reciprocal 
claims that the capacity is actualized and we really live as persons.,,89 
86T. H. Green. "Liberal Legislation and the Freedom of Contract" in R. L. Nettleship ed., Works ofT H. Green 
Volume: III (London: Longmans Green, 1885-8) 
87 Green, Prolegomena, p. 114 
88 See Vincent and Plant, Philosophy, Politics and Citi::enship, pp. 21-23 











Green argues that society and communal life are the realms in which characters develop, and 
such environments are only possible when individuals are prepared to accept others as 
persons and treat them as ends in themselves. In doing so, beneath all the social tensions and 
disputes, lies the 'common good', the 'mutual recognition of personality' integral to personal 
growth. The true good, according to Green is thus, "the perfection of human character-a 
perfection of individuals which is also that of society, and of society which is also that of 
individuals.,,9o History reveals, according to Green, the breaking down of barriers to mutual 
recognition which enables people to pursue their own ends. Like Hegel, Green therefore 
believes that history represents the gradual development of freedom within society. In 
contrast to the thought of Mill, Green's metaphysical theory of the state is founded on his 
Monism, belief in the eternal consciousness and his view that morality and realization of the 
'common good' is made possible through state reforms. Unlike Mill's empirical view of the 
state which claimed that the role of the moral state was to provide the conditions for 
individual self-development through education, Green believed that morality was something 
manifested within society that had to be realized through the realization of the eternal 
consciousness and, hence, the common good. 
* 
The metaphysical theory of the state offered by Green is the crucial foundation upon which 
one can make an analysis regarding the relationship between Idealist thought and colonial 
rule. The importance of historical development and the role of the state in achieving the 
'common good' are essential in understanding the views Idealists held regarding international 
relations. Because history represents the unfolding of reason and development of freedom 
within the world, international relations, from the Idealists perspective, had to be accounted 
for. Colonialism, by the tum of the century, was a fact of life that required explanation and 
thus, by using Green' s philosophy as the philosophical basis of the Idealist tradition, one can 
draw interesting insights from the Idealist justification for colonial intervention. By looking 
at the work of Bernard Bosanquet and J. H. Muirhead, both of whom were students of Green 
and whose own philosophies are greatly indebted to his work, one is able to analyze the 
attitude of the Idealist tradition towards colonialism which, in tum, reflects the change in 
trajectory of the liberal tradition itself. 











I1I.Bosanquet and Muirhead: Idealism, the State and Colonial Rule 
The question of colonialism brings to attention the importance of Bosanquef s formulation of 
the General Will in legitimising the state and determining what role it should play within 
society. Furthermore, it highlights how tradition and historical context affect the external 
affairs of the state. The work of Bernard Bosanquet, which is often claimed to be an 
elaboration and augmentation of the ideas of Green, under whom he studied, arguably 
provides the clearest departure from the classical tradition and thus his formulation of the 
General Will and views on the state and international relations, provides a useful foundation 
on which to establish the trajectory of the Idealist's liberalism and their attitude towards 
colonial rule. 
Although his theory of the General Will was heavily criticised by those who found Hegelian 
political thought 'morally reprehensible' and who argued that his philosophy was 
undemocratic and authoritarian, once one acknowledges his indebtedness to Green, it 
becomes evident that his ideas should be interpreted along the same lines and that the General 
Will is just another formulation of standard Idealist principles. His political philosophy was 
the dominant voice representing the Idealist tradition at the tum of the century thus making 
study of his arguments crucial to understanding the wider Idealist movement. In his obituary 
in the Times on the 10th February, 1923, Bosanquet was said to have been "the central figure 
of British philosophy for an entire generation" and Green described him as "the most gifted 
man of his generation." Bosanquet's philosophy and in particular his theory of the state, 
according to R. F. Hoernle, was "instinct with the best temper of his age" and was the 
"philosophical interpretation of the implications of public-spirited citizenship" which was the 
popular mindset of the people during that time. In 1890 Bosanquet wrote: 
We look forward to a society organized in convenient districts, in which men and women, pursuing their 
different callings, will live together with care for one another, and with in all essentials the same 
education. the same enjoyments, the same capacities ... The only thing I dread in the system known as 
Socialism is the cutting off individual initiative outside certain duties specified by rule ... What is wanted 
is the habituation of the English citizen to his rights and duties, by training in organization, in 











be: and the true union of social and individual reform lies in the moulding of the individual mind to the 
public purpose.91 
It is his theory of the state and formulation of the General Will which is of most relevance to 
the subject of colonialism. It sought to answer the question, 'how can man live in an 
organised society and obey its laws and yet still be free, that is, obey his own will and not the 
will others?' Put simply, the answer is revealed in three stages: (l) Freedom lies in 
conformity to our real will; (2) our real will is identical to the General Will; and (3) the 
General Will is embodied in the state.92 The idea of the General Will thus is a development of 
Green's idea of the common good. Bosanquet defines the General Will as the "ineradicable 
impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending beyond itself' where this 'good' refers to 
.. the existence and the perfection of human personality." Hoernle, defending Bosanquet's 
theory of the state claims that his concept of the General Will cannot be equated with the 
'actual will' of the people, nor is it identical with the consent to be governed by the acts of 
government. Rather, " .. .it is found only by pushing behind the surface-play of political forces, 
behind the details of constitutional machinery. It is the spirit of community, expressing itself 
through its laws and institutions, its customs and traditions, its industry and commerce, its 
national art and science, its philosophy and religion. With this spirit the individual learns, in 
his own unique way, to identify himself; he grows into one of the organs through which it 
lives on and develops itself.,,93 Through the correct organization and administration of 
political affairs, the General Will becomes realized within society. 
In explaining the relationship between the individual and the state, Bosanquet argues that the 
General Will is the only way of explaining how a free man can 'put up with compulsion and 
even welcome it'. He claims that any condition of outward authority, whether it be a city-
state, nation-state or world-state, is only legitimate if it is an expression of the General Will, 
91 Bosanquet, "Essays and Addresses," in Hoernle, "Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State," pp. 612-613 
92 See Stefan Collini, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State: Philosophical Idealism and Political Argument in 
England 1880-1918," Past and Present, Vol. 72 (August, 1976), p. 98 












and the General Will must represent a 'communal mind' .94 Bosanquet defines the state as 
"the power which, as the organ of a community, has the function of maintaining the external 
conditions necessary to the best life," where the 'conditions' are "claims recognised by the 
will of a community as the ... highest obtainable fulfilment of the capacities for the best life 
possessed by its members.,,95 Put simply, the state is the 'actuality of concrete freedom'. For 
Bosanquet, freedom cannot exist, in any sense, in a society where public irrationality stit1es 
the normal development of one's will in ordinary social enterprises and activities.96 
Bosanquet characterized the embodiment of the General Will in the state as follows: 
The State, as thus conceived, is not merely the political fabric ... lt includes the entire hierarchy of 
institutions by which life is deterrnined ... lt includes all of them, not as the mere collection of the growths 
of the country, but as the structure which gives life and meaning to the political whole ... lt fonows that the 
state, in this sense, is, above all things, not a number of persons, but a working conception oflife. 97 
Although not addressing the subject of colonialism directly, in his paper The Function of the 
State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind, Bosanquet frames the issue of state legitimacy and 
function in a way which illuminates the general position the Idealist's held towards colonial 
rule. He claims that when approaching any problem regarding the state, it needs to be 
answered by the question of how self-government is possible. He goes on to say that 
"anything which interferes with the possibility of self-government destroys altogether the 
conditions of true government." Presupposing Green's formulation of the Common Good, 
Bosanquet argues that self-government, and therefore true-government, draw on the concept 
of the General Will which exists in "an actual community, of such a nature as to share an 
identical mind and feeling.,,98 In essence, for Bosanquet, in line with the Idealist tradition in 
general, the state is the sustainer of morality within society. Although, in accordance with 
Green, Bosanquet argues that each individual acts depending with their position in society, it 
94 Bernard Bosanquet, "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. 17 (1916-1917), p. 29 
95 lbid. p. 29 
96 See Col1ini, "Hobhouse and Bosanquet," p. 104 
97 Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London: MacMil1an and Co., 1951), p. 140 











is the context of society that provides them with ideals that they should pursue and thus, the 
state embodies the values of its citizens and is the sustainer of the moral world. 
Bosanquefs position was to express a liberalism which justified state action only if it was an 
expression of the General Will. Individual liberty, as with Green, is only intelligible from the 
positive conception where the good of the individual and the good of society are 
indistinguishable; 'it realizes itself in me, and I in it' .99 This implies that with regard to 
colonialism and paternal rule, an Imperial government would only be legitimate if it served in 
the best interests of the colonized people, which would require a conception of the General 
Will. What becomes apparent is a distinct shift in the focus of the imperial task stemming 
from a change in what the 'best interests' of the colonized people were. Whilst for the 
classical tradition this implied paternal rule until such time as the colonial people were 
capable of operating and governing a state where the institutions were founded upon the 
individualist principle of liberty, for the Idealists to serve in the 'best interests' of the 
colonized was to provide them with the education necessary to achieve a communal 
coherence and possess a General Will. The question regarding colonial rule therefore rests on 
the concept of the General Will and, more specifically, it is answered by making possible for 
the colonized people self-government, which is true-government and which requires the 
expression of the 'communal mind'. Furthermore, because the state is the ultimate expression 
and sustainer of moral communities, with regard to colonial rule, the question over whether 
states have a responsibility to a wider-community and other states is integral. 
As mentioned earlier, colonial rule was something that needed to be explained by Idealist 
philosophy from a historical perspective. The fact that it existed and would simply 'go-away' 
required more than outright condemnation for its apparent failures. The problem that 
Bosanquet saw when dealing with the issue of international relations, and which is of critical 
importance to understanding the Idealist's view of colonialism, was that at the time he was 
writing, he saw no 'organism of humanity'. For such an organism to exist, he argued, 
"consciousness of connection is necessary" and went on to ask whether the "multitude of 
99 See David Boucher, "British Idealism, the State, and International Relations," Journal a/the History a/Ideas, 











humanity possesses any connected communal consciousness whatever?" He answered this 
question by claiming that other than the communities which speak through the state, no wider 
community or moral conscious exists, and stated quite plainly that "neither the main values 
which govern our aspirations to the best life, nor valuation of them, are possessions common 
to mankind." 100 Any form of state-like association wider than this, according to Bosanquet, is 
bound to fail for lack of common experience. This implies that the Imperial task could not be 
based on imposing upon the colonized people a conception of the 'best-life' in that 
knowledge of the 'best-life' would require a 'common conscience' between colonizer and 
colonized. Government in the best interests of the natives was thus not a sut1icient 
justification for colonialism, but rather providing the colonized with the means to achieve an 
understanding of what the 'best-life' was; to provide them with the ability to possess a 
General Will. It was believed among the Idealists that the colonized peoples of backward 
nations were not coherent communities sufficiently civilised so as to possess a General WilL 
and thus to provide such nations with the coherence of community necessary to make self-
government possible, fell to the responsibility of Empire. This, from the Idealist's 
perspective, was the task of Imperialism. 
1. H. Muirhead, in his paper, What Imperialism Means, provided an account of the Imperial 
task which follows closely from the ideas of Bosanquet. By drawing on the history of 
Empire, Muirhead claimed that to have a true understanding of what the Imperial task 
entailed, which is to understand why the colonial project for the Idealists was perceived 
differently from the interpretation of Mill and the classical tradition, required one to 
understand the phases through which the Empire had passed. There was a long period, 
Muirhead argued, that the British Empire, beset in utilitarian ideals, did nothing for their 
colonial subjects and the colonial ideal was fuelled by treachery and greed. In 1783, for 
example, Edmund Burke, commenting on the failure of the Empire in India said that, 
"England has erected no churches, no hospitals, has built no bridges. made no roads, cut no 
navigations, dug out no reservoirs. Should we be driven out this day nothing would remain to 
tell that it had been possessed by anything better than the ourang-outang or the tiger."lOl 
100 Bosanquet, "Function of the State," p. 47 
101 Edmund Burke, "Speech on Fox's East India Bill, December I, 1783," in, Works, Volume III (London. 











Henry Jones also deplored the earlier forms of Imperialism and stated forcefully that, "It was 
not by converting the heathen that we acquired their lands, nor for the sake of the "ends of 
civilization" that we drove the savages out of their hunting-grounds. We may say, with much 
truth, that our conquests have followed our trade, and what we now possess has come "in the 
way of business.",,[02 The following generation however, lead predominantly by Mill, offered 
a wider interpretation of the colonial ideal and, along with others of the classical tradition, 
believed that the true 'spirit of colonialism' was the spread of liberty, and that through the 
'spirit of industry, organization and civilization' the liberties, freedoms and duties owed 
among civilized nations, would be owed to all nations. The British Empire was thus 
considered the 'hope of mankind'. The ambitions and ideals this generation held regarding 
the colonial project are most eloquently encapsulated in the writings of Thomas Carlyle. 
This poor nation, painfully dark about said tasks and the way of doing them, means to keep its colonies, 
nevertheless. as things which somehow or other must have a value. were it better seen into. They are 
portions of the general earth where the children of Britain now dwell; where the Gods have so far 
sanctioned our endeavour as to say that they have a right to dwell. England will not readily admit that her 
own children are worth nothing but to be flung out of doors? England, looking on her Colonies, can say 
'Here are land and seas, spice-lands, com-lands. timber-lands, overarched by Zodiacs and stars, clasped 
by many sounding seas; Nations and their Sciences and Heroisms. Unspeakable deliverance and new 
destiny of thousandfold expanded manfulness for all men dawns out of the future here, to me has fallen 
the godlike task of initiative all that: of me and of my Colonies, the abstruse future asks: Are you wise 
enough for so sublime a destiny? Are you too foolish?103 
The 'spirit of Empire' the Idealists inherited from the classical generation and which required 
explanation, Muirhead argued, was in fact a 'lying spirit' whose guidance was foolishly 
followed by the exponents of the classical tradition. Although he conceded that the British 
Empire had begun to strengthen its social and political connections with its colonial subjects, 
and that the 'spirit of industry, organization and civilization' may have proved that the 
colonies of Britain could be held together, he argued that whilst this may make colonialism 
comprehensible, it does not justify it. He claimed to the contrary that, "Imperialism ... has been 
begotten in greed and treachery, and in endless unrecorded slaughter. It has produced ... an 
102 Henry Jones, "Why We Are Fighting," Hibbert Journal, Vol. 18 (1914-1915), p.56 











endless progeny of similar horrors" and it has been opposed by "not only the supporters of 
pinchbeck utilitarianism, but the greatest men of the century:' He claimed that fulfilling the 
Imperial task as conceived by the classical tradition, "only plunges us deeper in the crimes of 
the past; distracts attention from much needed home reforms, and presses on the masses of 
the people with an ever-growing burden of taxation." He thus concluded that the British "had 
no right to undertake [the duty of colonialism]" and that they had "no means of performing 
it". 104 Critically however, Muirhead argued that to repudiate the responsibilities of 
colonialism "would be a crime outweighing all we have committed in creating it," and thus 
the question that the Idealisf s needed to answer was not whether they were "right in 
undertaking all it involves, but how best [ they] shall perform it." 1 05 
In order to fulfil the requirements of this task one needed an acute understanding of the nature 
of the Empire. Muirhead claimed that the first step towards successfully acknowledging the 
responsibilities of colonialism was to acknowledge that the British Empire consisted of two 
distinct elements which posed equally distinct problems. On the one hand, the problem of 
Empire was mainly political and concerned the government of 'a few million Europeans in 
accordance with European traditions', such as in Canada and Australia. Here the task of 
Empire was to discover a system of government which, "while extending the Anglo-Saxon 
form of liberty, [kept] the members of the Empire in organic connection with one-another." 
This is the same problem that Jones was addressing in his lecture tour of Australia when he 
stated that, 
Reluctantly, but surely the whole world is becoming one mart. The ebb and flow of commercial and 
industrial prosperity travel round the world, and they creep into the most quiet creek and remote inlet. All 
the civilized, or productive, peoples of the world have one economic destiny ... That these deep economic 
changes must bring others in their trains is obvious. Interchange of commodities and identity of 
economic destiny bring interchanges of another kind ... Social and political impulses travel from state to 
state, and nations inspire one another to good ends and to bad. In short, changed outward circumstances 
compel reflexion; the new world demands a new response. \06 
104 All above quotes: Muirhead, "What Imperialism Means," p. 245 
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Formulating this 'response', Muirhead argued. was a distinctly ditlerent task from the more 
poignant and ambiguous task rooted in the other element of Empire and which required "the 
reconstruction of the moral, industrial and political ideas of four or five hundred million souls 
of every race and religion and at every stage of development except our own." 107 Such a 
reconstruction would be necessary to make coherent the moral, industrial and political ideas 
within these societies so as to provide them with the ability to recognise a General Will, and 
this was, therefore, predominantly a social and educational task. 
The problem that Muirhead was confronting with regard to the 'reconstruction' of native 
ideals was that whilst there should be no hesitation in spreading the European idea which 
claimed that justice is the basis of the moral and science of the material well-being of all 
people and civilizations, to make European ideas the basis of all that is taught raises serious 
doubts about the e±Iectiveness of the colonial project. He claimed that studies of native life 
showed that whilst the native people possessed the human capacity necessary to develop, the 
e±Iorts employed by the Imperial government to initiate such development had altogether 
failed. The reason for Britain's failure, argued Muirhead, was that "in setting about the 
education of these people we have taken no trouble to understand the people we are 
educating. We have not yet taken to heart and applied abroad what we have known for the 
last half-century at home, that there can be no true education where the ideas we aim at 
imparting stand in no organic connection with the ideas already there." The education that the 
British had thus far imparted, Muirhead continued, consisted of "nothing more than a thin 
veneer of European ideas sufficient to destroy the beliefs and sentiments that gave the mind a 
hold on the realities of life, but wholly insufficient to provide it with anything that can take 
their place." 108 This was the reason why native societies remained incoherent, unable to 
possess a General Will and ill-equipped for self-government. Freedom and the ability of self-
government were not gifts that the colonial government could endow upon the colonized. The 
idea of 'compulsory liberation' where the ideal of liberty was to be forced upon backward 
nations was not sufficient or appropriate to raise the natives to the level where self-
government would be possible in that it did not encapsulate the existence of a 'communal 
107 Ibid. 246-247 
108 Muirhead, "What Imperialism Means," in David Boucher, ed, The British Idealists (Cambridge: Cambridge 











mind' among the colonized people. The ultimate aim, therefore, had to be the education of 
the native peoples to a level where self-government was possible, and this would entail 
encouraging the development of the best native traditions and customs. 109 The moral 
principle employed was thus rather one of maternalism and, to use David Boucher's analogy, 
to guide a nation to the age of reason "at which point it could untie itself from its mother's 
apron strings' .110 As Bosanquet argued, beyond the state, no wider community had yet to 
show an expression of 'communal mind' and thus it was imperative to the success of the 
'Imperial task' to provide a system of education within colonized societies that was rooted in 
the customs and traditions already there. Muirhead stated quite plainly on the failure of 
imperialism: "The mistake, of course, is that in setting about the education of these people, 
we have taken no trouble to understand the people we are educating. We have not yet taken to 
heart and applied abroad what we have known for the last century at home, that there can be 
no true education where the ideas we aim oat imparting stand in no organic connection with 
the ideas already there.,,111 
In essence, what Muirhead alluded to was that the history of Empire and the nature of 
imperial rule in the past had failed to fulfil the task of 'civilization' primarily because of what 
they perceived the Imperial task to be. For the Idealists, to impart upon 'lower races' the 
Anglo-Saxon principle of liberty, to construct a state framework that would foster a concept 
of liberty that aimed, above all, to protect individual liberty, without any recognition of the 
customs and traditions of the colonized people, would inevitably fail. Although the 
responsibilities of the Empire were not borne out of the principles of the Idealist tradition, 
their task was to accept these responsibilities and to use their entire moral and philosophical 
knowledge, not only to fulfil the task, but to also redetine what the task was in order to ensure 
it success. The imperial task was not, therefore, to ensure the progress of backward nations by 
putting them on the correct path towards self-government, as conceived by the classical 
liberal tradition, but rather to provide such societies with the level of education necessary 
appropriate to possess a 'communal mind' so that self-government implies choosing one's 
own path as an expression of the General Will. This, in many ways, shows a distinct shift 
109 See Boucher, "British Idealism, the State, and International Relations," pp. 682-683 
110 Ibid. p. 683 











away from the cultural bigotry expressed by Mill and his contemporaries and thus 
represented a change in the impetus behind the Imperial task from that of a definite 'moral 












ISAIAH BERLIN'S LIBERALISM IN THE POST-COLONIAL GLOBAL ORDER 
... there has, perhaps, been no time in modern history when so large a number ofhllman beings, in both the East 
and West, have had their notions and indeed their lives, so deepZv altered, and in some cases violentZv upset, by 
fanatically held social and political doctrines. /lC 
I. The Change in Trajectory of Western Political Thought after World War II 
Since the 15th century, the West used its moral prescriptions and resources to support its 
global domination, The 'ethical burden' of Western society, as expressed by both Mill and 
the British Idealists, was viewed largely in paternalistic terms, where 'backward' or 'savage' 
societies who had not yet reached the level of civilization necessary to enjoy the civil liberties 
of Western societies, required justified despotic intervention until such time as they were 
capable of responsible self-government. Recall Mill's famous claim that: "Despotism is a 
legitimate mode of dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement." 1 13 In his 
Consideration on Representative Government he was quite explicit when he stated that "the 
great majority of the human race" remained in such a "savage or semi-savage state," 
requiring that they be ruled by "the more advanced.,,114 This pattern of thought, which 
justified the West's 'civilizing mission', remained dominant until some years after the 
Second World War when a shift in global power and a restructuring of the global political 
order had a deiinitive impact on the trajectory of Anglo-American philosophy. 
With most European countries in economic ruin, and the United States responsible for over 
half the world's economic output, the post-war system, being remade in the image of the only 
Western power with no colonies of its own, was extremely inhospitable to European claims 
to their colonies in both Africa and Asia. Whilst the Atlantic Charter, signed by Winston 
Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, established the terms on which the United 
111 Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Henry Hardy (ed.) Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 229 
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States would extend aid to Britain after the War, it also initiated debate regarding the subject 
of colonial rule by declaring that the allies must, " ... respect the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under which they will live; and that they wish to see sovereign rights 
and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."ll5 Once the 
principle of self-rule had aligned itself with national liberation movements, the global system, 
which was by now determined largely by U.S interest and the needs of the Cold War, slowly 
began to accommodate the process of decolonization and by the end of the 1950's it had 
become almost irreversible. ll6 This is highlighted in Harold MacMillan's 'Winds of Change' 
speech, delivered to a South African audience on February 3rd, 1960, when he stated: "The 
wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth 
in national consciousness is a political fact and our national policies must take account of 
it:' 117 MacMillan' s speech also expressed concern for the growing tensions of the Cold War 
by claiming that the struggle regarding decolonized states would concern which side of the 
ideological fence they 'fell' and therefore, he argued, it was the British 'way of life' that was 
on trial to win the minds of uncommitted, newly independent nations. 
The context of the post-colonial order that emerged, therefore, was a universal system of 
states based on formal equality. Paternal intervention on the grounds of 'civilization' was no 
longer acceptable, and development became recognised rather in economic terms. In other 
words, the 'civilizing mission' of the West was replaced by the universal goal of economic 
development. Wealth and power was determined by economic competition within the global 
capitalist market as opposed to territorial expansion, and thus the West managed to maintain 
its global dominance and control over Third World states through the forces of the capitalist 
system. Equality between states occurred alongside growing economic and material 
inequality, with the West dominating the global provision of both goods and services using 
Third World resources. The process of decolonization led to complex restructuring of the 
global order which resulted in the post-colonial context reflecting a fundamental change with 
115 "The Atlantic Charter" in W. Arnold-Foster, Charters of the Peace (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944), p. 136 
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regard to Western domination in comparison to the colonial era, one which is traceable in the 
discourse of Anglo-American political thought. 
* 
These changes to the global structure were inevitably reflected in the discourse of Anglo-
American philosophy. The practice of philosophy as an autonomous academic discipline 
occurred much later in Britain than it did throughout the rest of Europe. It thus lent itself to 
being rapidly professionalized and prone to emulating the methods of the natural sciences, 
focussing more on its own technical problems, rather than confronting disagreements about 
political and moral ends. 118 The rise of analytical philosophy led to a paradoxical moment in 
Anglo-American philosophy after 1945, in that whilst its ideas and institutions became 
globally dominant, there was a sustained retreat from claims to their universality. One of the 
more blatant assaults on the field of traditional political philosophy carne from T. 0 Weldon, 
who claimed that philosophy should be concerned only with secondary problems involving 
language and concepts, and its purpose should solely be to "expose and elucidate linguistic 
muddles". He thus criticized the belief that political philosophers should be concerned with 
the "establishment and demolition of political principles" that form the 'blueprint for moral 
and political institutions'. 119 
This change in Anglo-American thought highlighted a marked shift away from the 
prescriptive method of dealing with practical politics, as characterised by the British tradition 
as early as Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century. Peter Laslett acknowledged the shift 
in the purpose of Anglo-American philosophy in his introduction to Politics. Philosophy. and 
Society in 1956 when he claimed that political philosophy, concerned with "political and 
social relationships at the widest level of generality," was dead. He suggested that a possible 
reason for this 'death' was that the problems and events of the post-war political arena were 
"too serious to be left to philosophers." 120 Laslett claimed that this' death' was primarily the 
responsibility of the Logical Positivists and their role in convincing philosophers to 
"withdraw unto themselves for a time, and re-examine their logical and linguistic 
118 Nash "Politics and Ethics," pp. 220-221 
119 See T. D. Weldon "Political Principles," in Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956) 











apparatus." 12 I This argument is supported by Robert Cummings in his two-volume book 
Human Nature and History, in which he argues that analytical philosophy, and in particular, 
positivism, scepticism, existentialism and historicism, exacted a heavy toll on the confidence 
of the political philosopher to assess political truths. 122 Analytical philosophy called into 
question the intelligibility of ethical statements which resulted in answers to questions such 
as, "Is an Indian as good as an Englishman?" or "Should I adopt a socialist mentality?" being 
reduced to, ,·It depends what you mean by ... ?" Part of this 'retreat', which both Laslett and 
Cummings address, was attributable to the fact that the horrors of the twentieth century 
placed man outside of the scope of reason, threatening political philosophy with the 
"irrational man" and destroying any concept of human nature trustworthy enough upon which 
to base political doctrine. 123 
In essence, political thought in the West began to focus on conceptual clarity and distinctness 
of meaning as important goals in themselves in that achievable ends are distinguished by their 
conceptual coherence, and conceptual confusion was seen as an obstacle to political ends. 
Regimes which endorsed collective goals were seen to be conceptually incoherent in that they 
are open to diverse meaning and thus could be easily manipulated. In direct contrast to the 
philosophy of the British Idealists, distinctive unity of the individual mind was preferred to 
meaning produced by the social process, such as the formation of the General Will. Anglo-
American thought in the post-colonial era thus often equates itself with the individualist 
liberalism which defends individual goals against collective, and therefore often implicitly 
rejects any collective threat which may challenge Western dominance. 
* 
The iconic figure of the liberal tradition in the post-war era was Isaiah Berlin who, in his 
most widely acclaimed essay "Two concepts of Liberty" sought to restore political 
philosophy to the meaningful place it had occupied for centuries within the Anglo-American 
philosophical discipline. Whilst staying within the boundaries of the analytical tradition, 
lei Ibid. p. ix 
In Robert Cummings, Human Nature and History, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), pp. 4-16 












Berlin argued that the challenges facing political philosophers in the twentieth century were 
to be blamed upon political movements that " ... put their faith in some immense, transforming 
phenomenon, like the triumph of reason or the proletarian revolution ... " and claimed that 
because such regimes believe in the 'ultimate end of man' they too "must believe that all 
political and moral problems can thereby be turned into technological ones." Such an outlook 
prophesising the "true history of humanity," Berlin argued, is nothing more than "the play of 
idle fancy.,,124 The West, in the post-war era, he continued, could easily be mistaken by some 
'alien' visitor for living in something very similar to this 'idyllic state,' in that all attention 
regarding political and social problems was left to professional philosophers on a technocratic 
level. This approach was criticized by Berlin for assuming a resolution of moral disagreement 
within Western politics, whereas in reality all it did was displace it. In his paper titled 'Does 
Political Theory Still Exist,' which appeared in the second edition of Laslett's Politics, 
Philosophy. and Society, he states that political theory is, in principle, possible only in a 
world where ends collide, a condition necessary to human existence. 125 This argument is 
continued in the opening line of "Two Concepts": "If men never disagreed about the ends of 
life, if our ancestors remained undisturbed in the Garden of Eden, the studies to which the 
Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory is dedicated could scarcely have been 
conceived:,126 The paradox, Berlin argued, was that in a time when literally the 'whole of 
mankind' was 'violently divided' by real political issues, political philosophy began to lead a 
'shadowy existence'. Despite this, however, he believed that the very nature of post-war 
society in the West, given the real need for choice between values of freedom, equality and 
justice, indicated "not the death of a great tradition but, if anything, new and unpredictable 
developments." 127 
Berlin's belief in value-pluralism and the philosophical need to defend a negative conception 
of liberty in order to avoid the dangers of authoritarian rule forms the basis of his world-view 
and offers an interesting lens through which to analyse how Anglo-American liberal thought 
12~ Berlin, "Two Concepts," p. 166 
125 Isaiah Berlin, "Does Political Theory Still Exist," p.8 
126 Berlin, "Two Concepts," p. 166 
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approached the problems facing the post-colonial world-order. His liberalism attempts to 
return to answering philosophical questions, facing the [then] contemporary global system, at 
the 'widest level of generality,' whilst at the same time confining his philosophical enquiry to 
a conceptual analysis. By looking more closely at both his pluralism and liberalism and 
establishing the basis of his world-view, insights into his views regarding the nature of the 
relationship between liberalism and colonial rule can be drawn. 
II. Berlin's Value Pluralism and Defence of Negative Liberty 
In a letter to Jean Floud dated, July 5 1968, Berlin stated that: "All central beliefs on human 
matters spring from a personal predicament.,,128 This statement, to a large degree, exposes the 
source of his own philosophy. The basis of Berlin's liberalism is rooted in his life-long 
detestation of ideologically inspired violence, a hatred which he ascribes to an event he 
witnessed in Petrograd at the age of 7, when he watched a terrified Tsar loyalist being carried 
off to his death by a wild lynch mob. 129 According to Berlin, this image never left him and 
was fundamental to his suspicion of political ideologies working towards the realization of 
some collective goal. 
Born in Riga, Latvia in 1909, Berlin moved to London with his family as a young boy, to 
escape the turmoil of the Russian Revolution. Schooled in England, he was the first Jew 
elected as a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford in 1932. In 1940, taking leave from his 
lectureship post at Oxford, he took up a position in New York working for the British 
Information Services, where his role was to compile weekly reports for the Ministry of 
Information regarding the state of public opinion in America, in a campaign against 
American neutrality towards the war. His job, in effect, was "to get America into the war.,,130 
After the bombing of Pearl Harbour, which initiated America's active military involvement, 
the success of his press surveys in New York led him to a position at the British Foreign 
Office in Washington where his task was to report on developments within American politics. 
128 Quote taken from, Hardy, "Introduction" in, Henry Hardy (ed.) Liberty, p. xxviii 
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Returning to Oxford in April 1946, the quality of his 'Washington Dispatches' had earned 
him the reputation of being one of more prominent political thinkers of the time, and he spent 
the vast majority of his professional career writing and teaching on the subject of political 
philosophy. His experiences during the war coupled with his life-long hatred of violence were 
crucial contributions to his liberalism, but it was the onset of the Cold War and the tensions 
of the changed global structure to which his philosophy most poignantly relates. 
* 
Berlin's liberal project is most clearly set-out in his widely acclaimed essay 'Two Concepts 
of Liberty,' which was written primarily in response to the growing threat of Soviet Marxism 
during the 1950's. It is important to note, however, that although the Cold War was central to 
his defence of negative liberty, 'Two Concepts' was written and crafted consciously during 
the period of decolonization. The dominant issues facing the world in the post-war period, 
according to Berlin, surrounded questions regarding the limits to legitimate coercion. 'Why 
should I obey anyone else?' 'If I disobey, should I be coerced?' 'What is the area that the 
subject should be free to do or be what he wants, without interference by others?' 131 As one 
delves more deeply into Berlin's arguments regarding the dangers of 'positive liberty' and the 
need for liberty to be acknowledged only from a 'negative' conception, his detestation of 
social ideologies pursuing a 'collective goal' or 'predetermined truth' becomes increasingly 
apparent. His belief that value-pluralism is a fact of the human moral condition and that the 
liberty for individuals to choose among these values is thus prior to all other values, makes it 
evident that although Berlin never confronts the issue of colonialism directly, his world-view 
implicitly relates to the tensions of the post-colonial order. 
His liberalism and the special importance he places on liberty are best understood from the 
perspective of his theory of value-pluralism, which is central to his ethical and political 
philosophy. As John Gray points out, Berlin's 'Two Concepts' was less significant in 
defending the 'negative' idea of liberty, than in grounding the worth of liberty on the conflict 
of values in human affairs. 132 In essence, Berlin connects the worth of liberty to the reality of 
moral conflict. Berlin defined moral thought as "the systematic examination of the relations 
131 Berlin, "Two Concepts," p. 169 











of human beings to one another, the conceptions, interests and ideals from which human 
ways of treating one another spring, and the systems of value on which such ends of life are 
based ... beliefs about how life should be lived, what men and women should be and do." 133 
His argument, as will become apparent after analysis of his liberalism, is that human history 
testifies to an eradicable and incommensurable diversity of competing moral values over 
which there exists no overarching standard. This is in contrast to the thought of the British 
Idealists who believed that morality existed in the realization of the 'common good' within 
the confines of state. Recall Bosanquet's claim that the state is the widest context through 
which the General Will can be formed. Berlin, on the other hand, claims that because there is 
no overarching moral standard, and given the formal equality between states, there exists a 
universal moral context. 
Although Berlin does not set out a systematic theory regarding the nature of values, his 
comments and statement regarding their origin are at times ambiguous. On the one hand, he 
seems to take a Romantic viewpoint, which he traces back to Kant, and claims that values are 
human creations and are not derived from nature nor are they to be conceptualised as 
'ingredients' of the universe. On the other hand, however, he comes precariously close to 
advocating a theory of 'natural law' and claims that there are common values shared between 
different cultural groups and societies that are not derived by a theory of human needs, but 
rather are constituted in history. He goes further to suggest that the fundamental nature of 
'natural law' is most often revealed during the experience of moral horrors and extreme 
situations. The short-coming of 'natural-law' doctrines, as John Gray argues, is that they are 
primarily concerned with the basis of morality and the foundational requirements for 
civilization, but do not take into consideration the conventions, cultures, customs and 
institutions of actual societies and, furthermore, provide "no direct route from a theory of 
human nature to the superiority of a liberal society.,,134 Berlin agrees with this argument and 
acknowledges that whilst natural-laws provide the basic-conditions necessary for a tolerable, 
workable, decent society, they do not tell us how much liberty is needed. What is required, 
according to Berlin, is a moral theory which takes into account the diverse histories and 
cultures of different societies. The right measure of liberty can only be assessed, according to 
133 Isaiah Berlin. The Crooked Timber a/Humanity, (New York: Vintage, 1959) pp. 2-3 











Berlin, once one understands "the total patterns of life" within a society.135 This view of the 
origin of values is significant to Berlin's defense of the value of 'negative' liberty. He claims 
that the freedom to think, enquire and imagine without constraint is imperative because 
human beings need to be able to have such mental freedom; to deny it to them is a denial of 
their nature. In other words, to choose between values and to have the freedom to make these 
choices is fundamental to human nature and needs to be protected. 
Berlin defines the concept of negative liberty with the principle of non-interference, that is: 
.. the wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom:,136 Whilst there has always 
been disagreement regarding how wide the area of non-interference should be, the 'negative' 
conception of freedom, argues Berlin, has always been central to the classical definition of 
liberty within the Western tradition. Hobbes in his Leviathan, for example, stated that, "A 
free man is he that...is not hindered to do what he has a will to do:' \37 Aside from the fact that 
the strong would suppress the liberties of the weak if freedom was left uncurtailed, human 
activities and purposes are not always compatible with one another. and thus because people 
place high value on other goals, such as, among others, freedom, equality, justice, and 
happiness, they are prepared to limit freedom in the interest of these other values. 138 Whilst 
freedom must be limited by law to ensure the attainment of these other values, Berlin argues 
that there ought to also be a minimum of personaL inviolable freedom for one to do or be 
what one wishes. Although it is true, he continues, that no man is ever completely free and 
that the liberty of some is dependent on the restraint of others, the concept of freedom for the 
restrained is not a different species of freedom compared to that of the more free, but rather 
that the scope or area of free action is smaller. He claims that, "to offer political rights, or 
safeguards against intervention by the state, to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed 
and diseased is to mock their condition; they need medical help or education before they can 
understand, or make use of, an increase in their freedom.',139 To reinforce his argument he 
135 Berlin, "Two Concepts." p. 170 , see also, Claude Galipeau. Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994). pp. 116-1 17 
137 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan in, Richard Tuck (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 146 
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states that "The Egyptian peasant needs clothes or medicine. before and more than, personal 
liberty, but the minimum freedom that he needs today, and the greater degree of freedom that 
he may need tomorrow, is not some species of freedom peculiar to him. but identical with 
that of professors, artists and millionaires:· 14o Liberty, in the 'negative sense', is thus not 
incompatible with certain forms of autocracy, in that it is concerned with the area of control, 
not its source. In other words. 'negative' freedom is not necessarily connected with self-
government. Although self-government may provide a better guarantee for the preservation 
of civil liberties. the two are not mutually dependent. 
The fundamental argument that Berlin makes, and which is of integral importance to 
understanding his liberalism within the post-colonial context, is that the type of freedom that 
men seek is not dependent upon social or economic conditions. What "troubles the 
conscience of Western liberals." however, is that the minority who possess the largest amount 
of freedom have gained it by exploiting or, at least by "averting their gaze" from those who 
are not free. 141 Equality of liberty, the repayment of debt by those with the most individual 
liberty to those who made that liberty possible, is the basis of liberal morality. It is therefore 
apparent that liberty is not the only goal of men. But what is important to understand is that 
an increase of social justice or an increase in equality comes at the expense of freedom. To 
compensate those who are not free, to 'lessen the shame of inequality', requires a curtailment 
of the freedom of those who have it. 
If the liberty of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, 
the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral. But if I curtail or lose my freedom in order to 
lessen the shame of such inequality, and do not thereby materially increase the individual liberty of 
others, an absolute loss of liberty occurs. This may be compensated by a gain in justice or in happiness or 
in peace, but the loss remains ... 142 













The question remains, however, that although the freedom of some must at times, be limited 
to secure the freedom of others, upon what criterion should this be done? Although Berlin 
never provides such a principle, and rather suggests that the area of non-interference is 
dependent upon the circumstances of diflerent societies, what he does state explicitly is that 
some minimum area of personal liberty must be protected in order to avoid 'degrading or 
denying' our human nature: "total self-surrender is self-defeating:,143 The concept of 
'negative' liberty that Berlin defends is in opposition to the 'positive' conception which 
involves 'freedom to do' as opposed to 'freedom from constraint'. 'Positive' liberty, he 
argues, freedom to lead a 'prescribed' form of life, often represents nothing "better than a 
specious disguise for brutal tyranny.,,144 
Berlin defines liberty in the 'positive' sense as stemming from the wish, on part of the 
individual. to be his own master. Such a conception lends itself to 'splitting' the individual 
into a 'higher' and 'lower' form of self~ the lower, empirical self influenced by passion, and 
the higher 'ideal" or 'real' self. In order to be truly free and master of one's self~ one needs to 
realise the 'higher' form. The danger that Berlin alludes to is that the 'ideal' self may be 
conceived as something greater or larger than the individual. such as the state, the Church or 
the 'social whole' and thus gives such a 'body' the right to paternalistically protect the 
individuals 'ideal-self from its lower form. By imposing upon the individual the will of the 
collective, the 'ideal" self will eventually be realised and a 'higher' sense of freedom reached. 
Those, 'single-minded Monists' who subscribe to this concept of freedom, according to 
Berlin, rest their philosophy on two principles: firstly, that the cosmos exhibits a fixed 
structure (including human nature and moral life) and, secondly, that all just political regimes 
which hold to a fixed structure of moral ends are rationally intelligible, and commit, what he 
calls, the 'Ionian fallacy' .145 The notion of the 'ideal' self can be manipulated at the level of 
theory and therefore "enough manipulation of the definition of man, and freedom can be to 
mean whatever the manipulator wishes:,146 In this way freedom. conceived in the 'positive' 
sense, can be made to serve the needs of "every dictator. inquisitor and bully who seeks 
1~3 Ibid. 
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moraL or even aesthetic, justification for his conduct.,,147 What makes such a conception 
plausible, however, is that is possible to justifiably coerce someone in the name of some 
'greater good' that if they were more enlightened, they would pursue themselves. This, 
Berlin claims, was the argument of Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet, and it is this argument that 
has been responsible for the fact that " ... there has, perhaps, been no time in modem history 
when so large a number of human beings, in both the East and West have had their notions 
and indeed their lives, so deeply altered, and in some cases violently upset by fanatically 
held social and political doctrines.,,148 In other words, whilst 'positive' liberty sets out to 
achieve 'universal truth' and the realisation of 'true freedom', the reality of history has shown 
that more often than not, it results in the greatest oppression of freedom. 
III. Berlin's Liberalism in the Post-Colonial Context 
There has been much discussion and argument regarding the distinction Berlin draws 
between 'positive' and 'negative' liberty, but the greatest short-coming of Berlin's theory, 
argued Bernard Crick in his response to Berlin titled 'Freedom and Politics', is that whilst it 
tells us at length what freedom is not, it tells us very little about what freedom is. 149 In other 
words, Crick argues that in the attempt to avoid the error of confusing the actions which 
allow us to be free and freedom itselt~ Berlin walks too cautiously and virtually separates the 
concept of freedom from any real political or social context. Berlin does not recognise, 
according to Crick, that freedom is both a 'peculiar relationship between people' and an 
'activity by people' and in so doing, " ... freedom is being left alone from politics.,,15o Crick's 
claim, therefore, is that there is reciprocity between politics and freedom, and he defines 
politics in three significant steps. As an institution, politics is the conflict of differing interests 
in an acknowledged mutual context, as an activity it is the conciliation of these differing 
interests within the public context created by the state, and as a moral activity it is the 
creative conciliation of these interests. "Freedom" according to Crick, is "the activity of 
1,)7 Ibid. 197 
1,)8 Ibid. p. 229 
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private men who help to maintain public politics:,151 Totalitarian ideologies that do not 
identify the value of politics are 'anti-political' and thus weaken freedom. Crick's criticism of 
Berlin is extremely useful when reading Berlin's liberalism within the post-colonial context 
in that it elucidates the point made by Nash that his theory of freedom, in effect, places the 
real struggles of the post-colonial order outside the sphere of freedom and, as a result, keeps 
the majority of humankind outside the realm of philosophical enquiry. 152 
Michael Ignatief in his biography of Berlin argues along similar lines and states that whilst 
Berlin tells us clearly what liberalism stood against. he was rather quiet on what it stood for. 
In other words. he never says how much justice or equality is compatible with negative 
liberty or how much social justice is, in fact, required. In his polemic against positive liberty 
and its pitfalls, Berlin leaves his commitments to social justice unspecified. 153 Furthermore, 
Ignatieff also highlights another source of conflict within Berlin's liberalism which is that it 
never explains why 'negative' liberty should have priority over other values. 154 Unlike for 
MilL for example, who claimed that liberty was superior in that it is a necessary condition for 
the grow1h of human genius, Berlin argues that this relationship is contingent, not necessarily 
in direct relation. By separating a defence of liberty from any claim it has on emancipating or 
improving the human condition, Berlin's only defence for the priority ofliberty is his value-
pluralism. In other words, a regime of negative freedom provides the best guarantee of a free 
social life. 155 What is of significance to an examination of Berlin' s philosophy, therefore, is 
that whilst he presents a liberalism offering a universal standard, it is quite clearly confined to 
the bastions of Western society. 
This becomes apparent in reflection on his discussion regarding the goals or objectives of 
liberation movements. Unlike Mill and the British Idealists. Berlin says very little on the 
151 Ibid. 51 
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subject of colonialism directly, yet he does ascribe to a particular world-view of the post-
colonial order to which his philosophy relates. Although Berlin never provides principled 
support for the practice of colonialism it becomes apparent from his arguments, however, that 
the type of freedom promoted by colonial rule is an example of the illusion of 'positive' 
freedom, of 'despotism disguised as liberty'. "Paternalism is despotic" according Berlin, "not 
because it is more oppressive than naked, brutal, unenlightened tyranny, nor merely because 
it ignores the transcendental reason embodied in me, but because it is an insult to my 
conception of myself as a human being, determined to make my own life in accordance with 
my own (not necessarily rational or benevolent) purposes, and, above all, entitled to be 
recognised by others.',156 Berlin's argument that rationalism in politics leads to the idea that 
freedom is achieved by following those who know better. which is an example of 'positive 
liberty,' is also a criticism of Mill's support for colonial intervention within 'backward' 
societies and his support for 'compulsory liberation'. Berlin also argues, however, that the 
'collective identity' or 'collective goals' which fuelled the objectives of liberation 
movements, also fail to escape the pitfalls of 'positive' liberty. In line with the analytical 
tradition which places much emphasis on conceptual clarity, the collectivism that liberation 
movements subscribed to were conceptually incoherent. Berlin argues that the demand for 
'collective liberation' is, in reality, not a demand for liberty at alL nor is it a demand for 
equality or justice, but rather a demand for recognition as a responsible human agent. This 
demand for recognition is so powerful, according to Berlin, that: 
.. .1 may, in my bitter longing for status, prefer to be bullied and misgoverned by some member of my 
own race ...• by who I am. nevertheless, recognised as a man and a rival-that is. as an equal- to being well 
and tolerantly treated by someone from some higher and remoter group. Someone who does not 
recognise me for what I wish to feel myself to be ... and ... [It] is this desire for reciprocal recognition that 
leads the most authoritarian democracies to be. at times, consciously preferred by their members to the 
most enlightened oligarchies, or sometimes causes a member of some newly liberated Asian or African 
State to complain less today, when he is rudely treated by members of his own race or nation. than when 
he was governed by some cautious, just, gentle. well-meaning administrator from outside.,·!57 
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What is sought in pursuing self-government, according to Berlin, is akin to what Mill called 
"Pagan self-assertion:' but in a collective form. He draws an interesting parallel between the 
reasons Mill gives for desiring liberty- such as the value he puts on non-conformity and 
individual assertion of one' s values in the face of prevailing opinion- and the demand by 
liberation movements for recognition. He claims that the reasons behind Mill's desire for 
liberty has little to do with his concept of 'non-interference,' but rather with the concern of 
men not to have their personalities 'set at too Iowa value' and assumed to be incapable of 
mature, authentic behaviour, even if this behaviour is restricted by legislation. 15s This is a 
similar desire to that of men who have fought for self-government. with little or no individual 
liberty, to be able to participate in the politics affecting their lives. In this way, the desire for 
freedom- which is indeed connected to the answers the questions such as 'What is the area of 
authority?' and, more particularly, 'Who is to govern us?' - is confused with freedom itself. 
Recall that negative liberty is connected to the question 'Over what area am I free?' which is 
distinctly ditTerent from and, both socially and politically independent of, the extent of 
negative liberty one demands for one's group or society. The 'plea' for liberation, according 
to Berlin is just, but "it does not allow for the basic human needs. Nor yet for the ingenuity 
with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the road to one ideal also leads to its 
" 159 contrary. 
The relationship between Berlin's conceptual analysis of liberty and the tensions of the post-
colonial order is best understood by his warning that the desire for freedom is too often 
confused for freedom itself. It was at this point, recall, that Crick argued that Berlin separates 
the concept of freedom from any real political or social context. The concept of 'negative' 
liberty thus has the complex limitation of failing to take into account the pervasive struggle in 
the post-colonial world for status and recognition and thus his defence of negative liberty 
leaves liberation struggles and the real working of the global system in the post-colonial era 
outside the sphere of philosophical enquiry. The struggle for recognition, which found 
expression among the post-colonial states in Africa and Asia, led to the choice: dignity for the 
many or freedom for the few; an increase in social equality and justice or a loss in liberty. 
Berlin finds a resolution by stating that the course of history has shown that values among 
158 Ibid. 206 











men are often incommensurable and thus negative liberty is the superior value in that it 
acknowledges this fact and allows for men to pursue their own goals and values. Given this, 
although he never explicitly justifies inequality, his defence of 'negative' liberty and the fact 
that he places the quest for recognition beyond the scope of freedom, Berlin seems to 
implicitly ofter a justification for global inequality. As the iconic figure of Anglo-American 
liberal thought during this time, Berlin's theory of liberty attempts to offer an answer to 
questions regarding limits to legitimate coercion at the 'widest level of generality', but 
confines himself to conceptual analysis. 
* 
Berlin's liberalism set the foundation of Anglo-American thought in the post-colonial era 
which has been most influentially built upon by the works Rawls and Nozick. The defence of 
individual gaols against the collective that characterised the Anglo-American tradition in the 
post-colonial context can thus be contrasted with the work of both Mill and the British 
Idealists and understood within the context of a restructured global order. In practice, post-
colonial Anglo-American political theory has resulted in the endorsement the regime of 
individual rights, which is characteristic of the capitalist West. As is clear with Berlin's 
defence of 'negative' liberty, although Western thought does not necessarily defend global 
inequality or colonial rule, by treating any challenge to Western dominance as theoretically 
incoherent, it fails to provide solutions to the real problems, or even the real politics, 
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